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Abstract 
The paper requires that equilibrium behavior for two person symmetric games be resistant 
to genetic evolution. In particular the paper assumes that the evolution of genotypes 
selecting a behavioral rule can be described according to some generalization of the 
replicator model. This paper defines an equilibrium concept, 'evolutionary equilibrium', 
which is defined as the limit of stationary points of the evolutionary process as the 
proportion of the population that mutates goes to zero. Then the set of evolutionary 
equilibria, as defined in the paper, is a nonempty subset of the set of perfect equilibria 
(and thus of the set of Nash equilibria) and a superset of the set of regular equilibria and
the set of ESS. 
EQUILIBRIA RESISTANT T O  MUTATION 
Richard Boylan * 
1 Introduction
Many games cannot be solved in pure strategies. The solution is then for one of the 
players to play a mixed strategy; in other words to select a strategy according to a 
specific randomization device. Numerous scholars (Rubinstein (1988) ,  for instance) find 
troublesome that optimal behavior should follow by chance. Thus it seems useful to 
give a different interpretation of game theory. Instead of imagining two specific players 
confronting the game, suppose that there is an infinite population of potential players. 
At each period, players are randomly and anonymously matched. Each player plays a 
pure strategy. Equilibria in mixed strategies are then interpreted as equilibria where the 
population is not homogeneous 1• 
One of the justification for assuming that people use optimal strategies is the belief 
that such strategies are 'evolutionary stable'. If (i) particular strategies are transmitted 
genetically and (ii) evolutionary laws select for optimal strategies, then people will act as 
optimizers. In most games there are no optimal strategies since best responses depend 
on what other players choose. However there may be modes of behavior that will persist 
and are immune to genetic drift. This paper examines a specific model for the study of 
' The author thanks Richard McKelvey for helpful comments and many enlightening discussions. 
Comments by Kim Border and George Mailath on earlier drafts were also helpful. Financial support 
provided by the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Fellowship and the Alfred P. Sloan Dissertation 
Fellowship is duly appreciated. 
1 Harsanyi (1973) gives a similar interpretation of 1nixed strategies. Harsanyi justifies mixed strategies 
by players' uncertainty on their opponents payoffs (or types). In particular the payoff function for player 
i of type e; is u; + <e;. A type knows his own value of�; and knows the distribution function for �i over 
the set of possible types S;; in particular, all players know that the expected value of �j is zero. Then 
in equilibrium each type selects a pure strategy and each player plays the mixed strategy determined 
by the pure strategy played by each type and the distribution of types. Furthermore a mixed strategy 
equilibrium in the complete information game is the limit as € goes to zero of equilibria of incomplete 
information games. 
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genetic evolution which is called 'the replicator model' 2• In particular the paper seeks 
to define and characterize equilibria of the evolutionary process. 
There is a very large literatnre in game theory which discusses different definitions 
of equilibria. The equilibrium concept which is used by economists is called 'Nash Equi­
librium' although game theorists have given numerous examples where the equilibrium 
concept is inadequate 3. A strengthening of the notion of Nash equilibrium has led to 
the concepts of 'perfect equilibrium' and 'proper equilibrium' 4• This paper examines the 
relationship between equilibria of the genetic process and existing equilibrium concepts 
in game theory 5. 
The replicator model describes the distribution of strategies in the population in 
terms of a differential equation. Thus in order to examine the dynamic equilibria of 
the replicator model it is necessary to solve a system of nonlinear differential equations 
which is usually done trough numerical simnlations. Alternatively there are static equi­
librium concepts that can be defined for the replicator model and which can be solved 
analytically. A particularly well known static equilibrium concepts is Maynard-Smith 
and Price's (1973) evolutionary stable strategy (which is denoted in this paper by ESS) .
This paper defines a different static equilibrium concept called 'evolutionary equilibrium'. 
The equilibrium concept is based on an arbitrarily small proportion of genes mutating 
towards a 'random' strategy. 
The second section of the paper describes the replicator model and its relationship 
with the concepts of Nash and perfect equilibrium. The third section of the paper de­
fines and establishes formal properties of an evolutionary equilibrium. In particular this 
section proves that an evolutionary equilibrium exists for a large class of payoff matrices. 
The fourth section analyzes the relationship between evolutionary equilibria and other 
equilibrium concepts in game theory: the set of evolutionary equilibria is a subset of the 
set of perfect equilibria and a superset of the set of regular equilibria. Throughout the 
paper definitions are indicated by italics. 
2 The replicator model
Suppose that individuals from a large population are paired randomly. Each individual 
selects a strategy i E {l, . . .  , n}. The scalar Xi is the proportion of individuals who
select strategy i and the column vector x = (xi, . . .  , Xn ) describes the proportion of the
2The following authors discuss the properties of the replicator model: Hines (1987), Hofbauer (1981 ) , 
Schuster et al. (1981), Taylor and Jonker (1978), Zeeman (1979). 
3See for instance van Damme (1987). 
4These equilibrium concepts were introduced in Selten (1975) and Myerson (1978). 
5The following paper discuss similar issues: Crawford (1988), Friedman (1988), Nachbar (1990), 
Samuelson (1988). The following papers discuss these issues in some more specialized contexts: Axelrod 
and Hamilton (1981), Boyd and Lorberbaum (1987), Crawford (1989). 
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population that adopts each possible strategy. Thus x E L::. n where
n 
c,.n = {x E 3?�: I;x; = l}.
i=l 
If an individual selects strategy i and is matched with an individual that has selected 
strategy j, a;j ( a;1 2: 0) individuals will adopt strategy i in the next period. The matrix
A, where 
( "'
A= ��'.
Cln1 
a12 
az2
anz 
) 
) ' 
is called the payoff matrix for the evolutionary game. Then the proportion of the popu­
lation adopting strategy i at time t + 1 is
t+i ' (Ax'); x - x i i xt . Axt
where (Ax); = 'Z:;'J=1 a;jXj and x ·Ax= 'Z::i=I 'Z:;'J=1 a;jXiXj. The next proposition shows
that the law of motion is well defined. 
Proposition 1 If x0 E c,.n then for t= 1, 2, . . . , x' E c,.n. 
The last expression can be rewritten as: 
t+1 t , (Ar'); - x' · Ax' X· - X· = x-�------i i i xt. Axt 
or by dropping the time subscripts 
(Ax); - x · Ax _ D L::.x; = x; 
A = 
R; (x). x . x 
(1) 
The system of difference equations L::.x = RD ( x) is called the replicator model in discrete
time; when we need to specify the payoff function, A, the replicator model model is 
denoted by RDA. Let L::.t = -A
1 
be the time interval between periods; then
X· X 
L::.x; = x; [(Ax); - x · Ax] L::.t
By letting L::.t -> 0 the last expression can be written as: 
Xi= x; [(Ax); - x · Ax]= Rf(x)6. (2)
6Hofbauer (1981) noticed that by setting b;; =a;; - an; and letting y; = x;/xn, expression (2) can
be rewritten as n-1
iJ; = y;(bin + L b;;Y;) (i E {I, .. . ,n- l})
j:;;; 1 
which is the Volterra-Lotka equation. 
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The system of differential equations :i: = R0 ( x) is called the replicator model in contin­
uous time; again when we need to specify the payoff function, A, the replicator model is 
denoted by R�. Let the function X : �n x �+ --> �n be such that for all t E �+ and 
x0 E fln, 
dX
�;
xo) 
= R0(X(t,x0)) and X(O,x0) = x0 7. 
The next proposition states that this system too is well defined. 
Proposition 2 If x0 E Lln and t E �+ then X(t, x0) E Lln.
The next theorem describes one of the most important properties of the replicator 
model. 
Theorem 1 If (x, x) is a Nash equilibrium of the normal game (A, AT) then x is a
stationary point of the replicator model. 
Unfortunately there are stationary points of the replicator model that are not Nash 
equilibria of the normal game. 
A partial converse of the theorem was given by Bomze (1986).
Theorem 2 (Bomze) (i) If x is a stable stationary point 8 of the replicator model in 
continuous time then (x, x) is a Nash equilibrium. (ii) If x is an asymptotically stable 
stationary point 9 of the replicator model in continuous time then ( x, x) is an isolated 
perfect equilibrium. 
Unfortunately, asymptotically stable stationary points are difficult to characterize and 
do not always exist. This paper further characterizes the relationship between the repli­
cator model and game theory. The idea is to look at stationary points of the replicator 
model that are resistant to mutation. 
7The existence and uniqueness of X follow from the differentiability of Re. 
8 .A&n equilibrium .X is stable if given any positive scalar £, there is a positive scalar 8 such that for 
all strategies x in the ball centered at i: and with radius 5, xEB(x,5)nt:.", and for all positive t, 
X(x, t)EB(x, <) n t:.0. 
9 An equilibrium x is asymptotically stable if it is stable and if 6 can be chosen such that 
\fxEB(x,5), lim,_00X(x,t) = x 
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3 Evolutionary equilibrium
This paper examines a class of laws of motion somewhat more general than the replicator 
model. Let 
HA - { H : Cl n ---t T Cl n I :IL : T Cl n ---+ T Cl n such that L is continuously
differentiable, Li(Y)Yi 2". 0, (Li(Y)Yi = 0 �Yi= 0), H =Lo R�} 
where T Cl = { x E 3rn I Li Xi = 0}. In order to make the notation less cumbersome, when 
no confusion can arise the subscript A in HA, is dropped. Clearly if L( x) = Inxn then
H = RC and H E H. If L(x) = x!xinxn then H =RD and H E H 10. Suppose that
the strategies selected by the offsprings are subject to mutation. Assume that the set of 
possible mutation rates is 
Mn = { m : Cl n ---+ T 6.n Im is bounded, continuously differentiable and 
(If A C { 1, . . .  , n } )  I: xi = 1 � I: mi ( x) :S 0}.
iEA iEA 
Again, when it does not lead to confusion, the subscript n is dropped. 
For an evolutionary game with payoff matrix A, the generalized replicator model
H E H, and the mutation function m E M, define an evolutionary system by the 
following differential equation: 
6.x = (1- µ)H(x) + pm(x) (discrete version) 
x (1 - p)H(x) + 1im(2:) (continuous version). 
A vector x is an evolutionary equilibrium for the payoff function A and the generalized
replicator model H E 1{ if for every function m in M there is a scalar µ' E (0, 1) and a 
vector valued function x: (O, p')---+ 6.n such that for all µE(O, µ'), 
and lim,,iox(µ) = x. 11
(1 - p)H(x(p)) + µm(x(1l)) = 0 
The following theorem by Jiang Jia-He (1963) (which generalizes the better known 
theorem by Fort ( 1950)) is used in the proof of the existence of evolutionary equilibria. 
10The set 1i includes other functions such as H(x) = ((x1[(Ax)1 - x · Ax])3, -(xi[(Ax)i - x · Ax])3)
where L: T6.2 � T6.2 is defined as L(y) = (yy, -yy). 
11Showing that a vector of strategies is an evolutionary equilibrium by using the definition seems quite 
hard. In many examples a simpler procedure will be the following: (i) first show that there exists an 
evolutionary equilibrium; this paper gives a sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria, 'nonde­
generacy,' which is straightforward to check. (ii) Serially eliminate all strictly dominated strategies. If 
there is a unique Nash equilibrium that puts positive \veight only on undominated strategies then this 
will be an evolutionary equilibrium. rrhe validity of t.his procedure is proven in the rest of the paper. 
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Let X be a compact convex subset of a normed space, let d be a metric defined on X, 
and let C(X, X) be the set of continuous function with domain and range in X. Then
(C(X,X), p) is a metric space where
p(J , g) = SUPxEXd(J(x), g(x)).
Finally, let F: C(X, X) --> X be the fixed point correspondence; i.e., for all f E C(X, X) 
F(J) = {x E X  I f(x) = x}.
A set D is said to be iotally disconnected if all the connected subsets of D are singletons. 
Theorem 3 (Jiang Jia-He) Suppose F(J) is a totally disconnected set. Then there is
a vector p in F(J) that satisfies the following property. For every neighborhood U of p 
there is an e > 0 such that: 
g E C(X,X) and p(J, g) < e =;. F(g) n u /= 0. 
The vector p described in the theorem is called an essential fixed point. 
For all subsets of the strategy set S C { 1, . .. , n}, let A Is be the matrix ( a;j )iES,jES·
A matrix A is said to be nondegenerate if for a.II S C { 1 ,  . .. , n} such tha.t #( S) 2: 2, the
matrix Als is nonsingular 12. 
Proposition 3 For all nondegenerate payoff matrices A there is an evolutionary equi­
librium. 
Proof: Fix a payoff matrix A and a generalized replicator function H E 'HA. In order
to be able to use Theorem 3 we need to construct a function, H', whose fixed points 
correspond to the stationary points of H. Let 
H': �n--; 3?n be defined by H' =I+ H. 
Notice that fixed points of H' a.re stationary points for H. Unfortunately the function
H' does not map its domain, � n into itself. In order to remedy this problem we extend
12The only property used in the paper is that there are finitely many symmetric equilibria in all the 
submatrices Als. I think that a necessary and sufficient condition for the latter property is 
V(i,j) C {l, .. . ,n), a;;= a;;=;. a;;# a;;. 
Notice that either assumption is much \veaker than the Lemke and IIowson nondegeneracy condition. 
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the function H' to a domain Et:. n which is invariant under the extension, fr. Specifically
let 
°' : Et:. n 
a(x) 
fI : Et:. n 
il(x) 
n 
{x E !Rn I L Xi = 1, Vi E {l, . . . , n}x; E [-M,M]}; 
i=l 
[O, 1) 
min{a E [O, 1) I a/nl + (1 - a)x E t::,n}; 
Et:. n 
H'(a(x)/n + (1- a(x))x). 
Notice that fixed points of H' are stationary points for Hand that all the fixed point of 
fI are in t::,n (and thus are fixed points of H') .  Since by assumption A is nondegenerate
there are finitely many stationary points to H and Theorem 3 is applicable. Let g = 
(1 -µ)H + µ(m +I) .  Then for small enough p, g: Et::.n ---t Et::.n and p(H,g) < t. A
fixed point of g corresponds to a stationary point of (1 - fl)H + µm. Thus the set of
perturbations allowed in the theorem includes the ones in the definition of evolutionary 
equilibrium. 
Fix m E M. Since all the conditions are satisfied we use Theorem 3 to prove the 
existence of an evolutionary equilibrium. Thus there is an x such that for every t > 0 
there is a µ, and a function 
such that Vµ E (0, p,) 
(1 - /l)H(x(p)) + 11m(x,(11)) = 0
and supµE(O,µ,)lx,(µ)- x i< t. Then since there are finitely many fixed points of H there
is an t' > 0 such that B(x, t' ) n F(H) = {:i:}. Forµ E (0, µ,,) let x(fl) = x,.(µ). Then
x : (0, µ,,) ---> 6 is such that 
(1 - p) H(1:(p) )  + wn(x(!')) = 0, 
a.nd x(fl)---> x. Therefore, x is an evolutionary equilibrium. ! 
4 R elationship between evolutionary equilibrium and
other equilibrium concepts 
The rest of the paper relates evolutionary equilibria to other game theoretic equilibria; 
i.e., equilibrium concepts that are derived from assumptions on the type of beliefs individ­
uals have and on Bayesian maximization. There a.re three reasons for being interested in 
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these relationships. (i) Showing that an evolutiona.ry equilibrium corresponds to a game 
theoretic equilibrium allows us to argue that individuals act 'as if' they are Bayesian 
maximizers. (ii) There are ways of computing game theoretic equilibria that can be used 
to compute evolutionary equilibria. (iii) Requiring that a game theoretic equilibrium be 
evolutionary stable refines the set of equilibria. 
The equilibrium concepts that are analyzed are following: (1) Nash equilibrium, (2) 
perfect equilibrium, (3) strict dominance solvability, (4) regular equilibrium, (5) proper 
equilibrium, (6) strictly proper equilibrium, (7) ESS, (8) essential equilibrium. 
4.1 Nash equilibrium 
The concept of Nash equilibrium is the most widely used equilibrium concept in game 
theory although it is often considered to be too weak (see however Bernheim (1984) and 
Pearce (1984 ) ). 
Proposition 4 An evolutionary equilibri11.m., .i, is a symmetric Nash equilibrium, (x, x). 
Proof: Let x be an evolutionary equilibrium. (i) Suppose that there is a strategy, say 1, 
such that i1 = 0. In order to prove that x is a Nash equilibrium it suffices to show that
(Ax)i :S xAx. Let m be such that m1(x) > 0 for all x in a neighborhood of x. Then
since x is an evolutionary equilibrium there is a µ1 > 0 and a function x : (0, µ ') --> L':. 
such that for every I' in (0, fl'), 
(1 - µ)H(i·(µ)) + µm(x) = 0.
This implies that for allµ in (0,µ1), (Ax(µ))i - x(µ)Ax(µ) < 0. Thus (Ax)i :S xAx. (ii) 
Suppose that x; > 0 and x1 > 0. Then, (Ax), - xAx = 0 and (Ax)1 - xAx = 0. Thus 
(Ax); = (Ax); . Therefore x is a Nash equilibrium. 
• 
In the next section we show that not ail perfect equilibria are evolutionary equilibria 
and thus that not all Nash eqnilibria are evolutionary equilibria. 
4.2 Perfect equilibrium 
There are several ways in which perturbations have been introduced in solution concepts. 
Evolutionary equilibria consider perturbations in the law of motion; essential equilibria 
(which are analyzed later in this section) consider perturbation in the payoff function; 
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finally, perfect equilibria consider equilibria that are 'resistant' to some perturbation of 
the strategy set. 
The next lemma is used in showing the relationship between perfect and evolutionary 
equilibria. 
Lemma 1 Let x be an evolutionary equilibrium. Then x; 
dominated 13. 
0 if strategy i zs weakly 
Proof: Suppose that strategy 1 weakly dominates strategy 2. Suppose that x is an
evolutionary equilibrium and x2 > 0. Let m E M be such that in a neighborhood of x (
where Xz > 0) 
mi(x) = 1, m2(x) = -1. 
Then since x is an evolutionary equilibrium there exists a constant 
x : (0, µ')-+ LI. such that for I' E (0, p')
(l-p)I11(y)+p 0 
(l-;1)H2(y)-;i - 0 
and limµ-ox(µ) = x. Condition (3) implies that 
x(p)Ax(;1) > (Ax(;1))i; 
condition ( 4)  implies that for all p E (0, p')
(Ax(p))z > x(p)Ax(p). 
Thus (3) and ( 4)  combined give 
(A1:(p))z > (Ax(p))i 
which contradicts the assumption of weak domination. 
p' and a function 
(3) 
(4) 
I 
Proposition 5 An evolutionary equilibrium is a symmetric perfect equilibrium. 
Proof: The result follows from previous lemma and van Damme (1987, Theorem 3.2.2):
for a two person finite normal game an equilibrium is perfect if only if every weakly 
dominated strategy is played with probability 0. I 
13 A strategy i is weakly dominated if there exists a strategy j such that the payoff to j is at least as 
great as the payoff for using i regardless of what the other players strategy and strictly better for some 
vector of strategy. 
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The next example shows that not all symmetric perfect equilibria are evolutionary 
equilibria. Let 
A=
( � � � ) ·
0 0 1 
The vector (x, x) where x = (0, 1, 0) is a symmetric perfect equilibrium but x is not an
evolutionary equilibrium (pick m(x) = (1,-1,0) for every x in a neighborhood of x). 
4.3 Strict dominance solvability 
The next proposition says that an evolutionary equilibrium is resistant to the elimination 
of dominated strategies. Thus restricting the replicator model to rationalizable strategies 
will not reduce the set of evolutionary equilibria. 
Proposition 6 Suppose that strategy j dominates strategy i and suppose that x is an 
evolutionary equilibrium for the payoff matri.r A. Let A_; be the payoff matrix where the
i th row and column have been deleted. Then .Ti is an evolutionary equilibrium for the
payoff matrix A_;. 
Proof: Let m' E Mn-l be a mutation function. Let m E Mn be such that
· ( ) - {  mj(:r) ifjoJim, x -
0 
·r . .1 J = i. 
Since x is an evolutionary equilibrium then for small enough µ' > 0 there is a function
x: (0, µ1)---> �n such that x(µ)---> x and for all ii E (O,µ'), (l-µ)HA(x(1i))+µm(x(µ)) =
0. Since x is a Nash equilibrium and since strategy i dominates strategy j, then xAx 2:
(Ax)j > (Ax); . Then there is a small enough µ" > 0 such that for all µ E (0, µ"),
x(µ)Ax(µ) >(Ax(µ));. Since m;(x) = 0 then xi(µ)= 0. Therefore, for allµ E (0,µ11),
(1 -µ)HA_;(x-;(µ)) + µm'(x-i(p)) = 0, and x_; is an evolutionary equilibrium for A_;.
II
An equilibrium is strictly dominance solvable if it is can be obtained by reducing the 
game to a single cell by iterated deletion of dominated strategies. 
Proposition 7 A strictly dominance solvable equilibrium is an evolutionary equi librium 14. 
Proof: Suppose that x is an evolutionary equilibrium, strategy 1 dominates strategy
2 in the normal game A{i ,. . .,n)-{4), and strategy 3 dominates strategy 4 in the gameA. By Lemma 1, x4 = 0. Suppose i2 > 0. Choose the function m such that for 
every x in a neighborhood of x, m1(x) = 1, m2(x) = -1. Then for small enoughµ,
(Ax(µ))2 > (Ax(p))t. But this is impossible since x4(µ)---> 0. Thus i2 = 0. II 
14Thus an evolutionary equilibrium is ecologically solvable as defined by Nachbar (1990). 
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4.4 Regular equilibrium 
The concept of regular equilibrium was introduced by Harsanyi (1973). The following 
description of the equilibrium is taken from van Damme (1987) although it is simplified 
by looking at two person symmetric games. Let z = ( x, y) be a vector of strategies for 
the game (A, AT). Let k E supp(x), let 1 E supp(y) and let m = (k,l). Then let F(xlk) 
be such that: 
n 
(Vi f k) F;(xlk) = x;[(Ay);-(Ay)k] and Fk(xlk) = I: x; -1.
i=l 
Similarly let F(yll) be such that 
Finally let 
n 
(Vi f 1) G;(yl1) = y;[(Ax); -(Ax)t] and G1(yl1) = L Yi -1.
i=I 
H(zlm) = (F(xlk), G(yll))T and J(zlm) = aH�:lm) lz=z·
Then z is a regular equilibrium if for some m E supp(x) x supp(y), H(zlm) = 0 and
<let J(zlm) f 0. 
Intuitively, a regular equilibrium is one for which the best response mapping is con­
tinuously differentiable at a neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium. 
Proposition 8 A symmetric regular equilibrium is an evolutionary equilibrium. 
Proof: Van Damme (1987, Theorem 9.4.3) proves that a Nash equilibrium (i, x) is reg­
ular if and only if dRc /dxlx=i is nonsingular. Notice that if dRc /dxlx=i is nonsingular
and µ is small enough then 
d c dx[(l -µ)L(R (x)) + 11m(x)Jl,,=o,x=x
is nonsingular. Therefore if (x, x) is a regular equilibrium then by the implicit function 
theorem x is an evolutionary equilibrium. I 
The next example shows that not all games with nondegenerate payoff matrices A 
have a regular equilibrium. 
Let 
11 
Player 1 
L R 
Player 2 
r 
,3 ,4 0,0 ,0  5,1 
Figure 1: Game with a proper equilibrium which is eliminated by forward induction. 
Clearly the matrix is nondegenerate and the only perfect equilibrium is 'top', 'left'. 
The Jacobian of the best response function (as defined by Harsanyi (1973)) at the equi­
librium point is 
( 0 0 0 
1 1 0 det 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
and thus the game has no regular equilibria. 
4.5 Proper equilibrium 
The game in Figure 1 is used by Tan and Werlang (1988, p.172) to show the insuf­
ficiency of the concept of proper equilibrium 15. There are two proper equilibria in the 
game: Rr and LI. By a forward induction argument Tan and vVerlang argue that since C 
is dominated by L, C should never be played and therefore 1 should never be employed 16. 
Therefore properness allows unreasonable equilibria, such as LI. Are Rr and LI evolu­
tionary equilibria? We can construct a symmetric game by assuming that two individuals 
are randomly assigned to the roles of player 1 and player 2. Figure 2 shows the extensive 
form for such a game. 
An evolutionary game is constructed by normalizing this extensive form. 
15x is proper if and only if there exist {c;} and x(<i) such that x;(<;) :<:::<;if i is not a best response 
and i;(<i) :<::: <;iiik(<;) if j is weakly dominated by k and limx(<;) =iii. 
16Ll corresponds to the equilibrium where player 2 warns player 1 that he will play I. Then player 1 
has the choice of playing Land receiving 3, playing C and receiving 2, and playing R and receiving 0. 
If player 2 gets to move he realizes that player I did not believe in his bluff. Then player 2 is better off 
not to follow with his threat and play r. 
12 
Player 1 
L 
,3 ,4 
0.5 
Nature 
0.5 
5,1 . ,3 -,4 ,0 ,0 
Figure 2: Symmetrization of extensive game in Figure 1. 
Rr 
Rl 
Cr 
Cl 
Lr 
11 
6 
.s 
1 
0 
4 
3 
1 5 
0 9 
3 0 
2 4 
;3 3 
7 7 
0 8 3 
4 8 3 
2 3 5 
6 3 5 
;3 6 6 
7 6 6 
5,1 
Notice that the matrix is degenerate. Rr is clearly a strict Nash equilibrium and thus a 
regular equilibrium (Van Damme (1987), Theorem 2.3.3) and thus an evolutionary equi­
librium. Notice that x = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) is a symmetric proper equilibrium 17. Suppose
that x is an evolutionary equilibrium. Then for all x in a neighborhood of x let 
m(x) = (1,0,0,0, 1,-2). 
Chooseµ small enough so that x(p)Ax(p) > 5.5 and x6 > 0.9. Then x2(µ) = x3(µ) = 
x4(p) = 0. The assumptions on m also give that x1(µ) > 0 and (Ax)6 > xAx > (Ax)s 
which is impossible given the payoff function. Thus x is not an evolutionary equilibrium. 
4.6 Strictly Perfect Equilibrium 
A Nash equilibrium is strictly perfect if it is resistant to all perturbations of the strategy 
set. The concept of strict perfect equilibrium resembles the concept of evolutionary 
equilibrium but as the following examples illustrates not every nondegenerate game has 
a symmetric strictly perfect equilibrium. 
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Let 
A= ( � �  �)· 
1 0 -1 
Then the game (A, AT) has no symmetric strictly perfect equilibrium but has a unique
evolutionary equilibrium x = (1, 0, 0) 18. 
4.7 ESS 
The most widely used equilibrium concept in evolutionary game theory is the the concept 
of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) . While evolutionary equilibria consider dynamic 
perturbation, ESS considers stable perturbation. A strategy x E li. n is an ( ESS) if for
any other strategy y E li. n - { x} there is an E1 such that for all E E ( 0, E1)
xA(Ey + (1 
-
E):r) > yA(cy + (1 - c):r). 
Thus contrary to the notion of evolutionary equilibrium, ESS considers mutation is a 
static framework. This condition can be rewritten in the following way. Strategy :r is an 
ESS if for all strategies y different than :r one of the two conditions holds: 
(i) 1·A:r > y A:r 
(ii) :rA.T = yA:r and :rAy > yAy. 
The next proposition relates ES S to the replicator model in continuous time. 
Proposition 9 (Zeeman) An ESS 1s an asymptotically stable stationary point of the 
replicator model Rf'. 
Unfortunately the requirements of ESS and asymptotically stable stationary points 
seem too strict as the following example shows. Let 
A= ( - :
-
�
-
�) 
18Proof: The vector (X, X) is the unique sym1netric perfect equilibrium, A is nondegenerate and thus
x is an evolutionary equilibrium. Consider the perturbation 2,l,2 ( <, <2. <). Suppose x( <) � {I, 0, O).
Then x1{<) + x2(<) 2: xi(<)+ x3(<); i.e., x2(<) 2: x3(<). This implies that x1(<) + x3(<) 2: xi(<)+ x2(<),
or x2(<) = x3(<). But this is possible only if xi(<) - x3(<) 2: xi(<)+ X3(<). Contradiction. 
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where E E  (0 , 1/3) . The only Nash equilibrium is x = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). The Hessian of the 
law of motion is negative definite therefore: ( 1) x is not asymptotically stable (2) and 
thus x is not an ESS (3) and the game has not asymptotically stable stationary points 
and no ESS; ( 4 )  since the determinant of the Hessian is nonzero, x is regular (5) and 
thus an evolutionary equilibrium. 
Suppose that E < 0. Then x is an ESS and is thus an asymptotically stable stationary 
point for the replicator model. The replicator model in discrete time in not stable at x 
since one of the eigenvalues of the linearized system is greater than one. Thus ESS are 
not necessarily asymptotically stable point of the replicator model in discrete time. 
Proposition 10 A hyperbolic stationary point of the replicator model in continuous time 
is an evolutionary eq11ilibrium. 
Proof: A sta.tiona.ry point is hyperbolic if and only if a.II the eigenvalues are negative. 
Thus the proposition follows from the implicit function theorem. I 
Proposition 11 An ESS is an evolutionary equilibrium for the law of motion Re. 
Proof: Let x be a.n ESS. van Damme (1987, Theorem 9.2.8, 9.4.8) shows tha.t there is 
a.n open ball U centered a.t x such that the function
V:U -+ Dr 
V(x) ITxf' 
is a. Lya.punov function a.nd such that x is the only fixed point of R0 in U. Take c to 
be large enough so that v-1(c) c U. Let X be the solution of the differential equation 
x = R0. For x E U, let F(x) = X(l,x). Then Fis continuous and maps v-1(c) into
v-1(c). Then by an argument similar to the one in proposition 3 one can show that
there x is an evolutionary equilibrium for Re. I
Fina.Hy notice that not a.II ESS are regular equilibria since the game matrix discussed 
in Section 4.4 ha.s no regular equilibria but has (1, 0) as the unique ESS. 
4.8 Essential equilibrium 
A Na.sh equilibrium ( x, y) is essential 19 for a game (A, B) if for a.n arbitrarily small
perturbation of the payoff matrix (A', B') there is a Nash equilibrium to (A', B') close 
19The equilibrium concept is defined by Wu Wen-Tsun and Jiang Jia-He (1962). 
1.5 
to (x,y). This notion predates the concepts of Hyperstable equilibrium introduced by 
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) 20. 
A symmetric Nash equilibrium ( x, x) for the game (A, AT) is symmetric essential if for 
any symmetric game with payoffs close enough to A there is a symmetric Nash equilibrium 
close enough to (x, i:). The next propositions characterize the set of symmetric essential
equilibria. 
Proposition 12 (Bomze) A regular equilibrium is a symmetric essential equilibrium. 
Proposition 13 (van Damme) An ESS is a symmetric essential equilibrium.
Proposition 14 Restrict the set of mutation jimction of the form m;(x) = x;[(Cx); + 
xCx]. Then a symmetric essential equilibrium is an evolutionary equilibrium. 
Proof: Suppose x is a symmetric essential equilibrium of the game (A, AT). Let m;(x) = 
x;[(Cx); + xCx] and let Aµ= (1 - /l)A + JlC. Then 
x(µ) = (1 - µ)x;(µ)[(Ax(p)); -x(11)Ax(p)] + px;(µ)[(Cx(µ)); + x(µ)Cx(µ)] 
x;(p)[(Aµx(p)); -x(!')Aµo•(/l)) = 0
if (x(µ), x(p)) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (Aµ, A�). But since i: is a symmetric 
essential equilibrium then for any perturbation of the payoff there is a Nash equilibrium 
arbitrarily close to i:. Therefore i: is an evolutionary equilibrium. I 
20 A subset, H, of the set of Nash equilibria for the game (A, B) is hyperstable if it is minimal according 
to the following condition: given any small perturbation of the payoff matrix, (A', B'), there is a Nash 
equilibrium to (A', B'), (x',y'), close to the set H. 
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